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3Executive summary 
Calling for Europe’s strategic autonomy at a time when 
the European Union (EU) is rife with political divisions 
on issues such as migration, the future of eurozone 
governance or the rule of law may seem paradoxical 
or distracting. However, strategic autonomy is not 
just a foreign policy issue but a critical requirement 
for sustaining and fostering European integration. 
The legitimacy and resilience of the EU will depend 
on unchaining Europe’s untapped power and enabling 
European citizens and member states to choose their 
future, as opposed to being the takers of the decisions of 
others in a very competitive international context. 
Strategic autonomy is not just a foreign 
policy issue but a critical requirement 
for sustaining and fostering European 
integration. 
After the crisis of long-held assumptions about the 
inevitable spread of the liberal international order on 
the heels of globalisation, the emerging consensus is 
that great power rivalry is the new norm. In particular, 
the standoff between the US and China risks becoming a 
defining feature of international affairs. If many factors 
and trends point to a more contested and volatile world, 
however, the future is not predefined: the EU will play a 
major role in the development of the international order, 
whether through its absence or its engagement. 
Building a more autonomous Europe is not just about 
better protecting Europe but also about projecting a 
positive agenda on the global stage, in line with Europe’s 
interests and values. This message can resonate deeply 
with multiple partners at a time of uncertainty. In 
other words, the question for Europe is not just how to 
brace for disorder, but also how to uphold the rules-
based order, while reforming it to meet new challenges. 
Europe’s overarching strategic objective for the years 
ahead should be countering and mitigating the drift 
towards a zero-sum world. This task will require a more 
robust approach and a stronger and wider power base 
than envisaged in the past. Strategic autonomy is an 
essential enabler of Europe’s shaping power.
This Discussion Paper elaborates on four key 
recommendations delivered by recent European 
Policy Centre publications: equip Europe to govern 
interdependence and mitigate confrontation, adopt a 
non-adversarial posture to cope with power politics, 
enhance the EU’s global shaping power and frame 
the debate on Europe’s strategic autonomy through a 
comprehensive approach. 
This Paper points to three central components of 
strategic autonomy: the political dimension, the 
institutional dimension and the functional dimension. 
Strategic autonomy is about setting objectives, 
making decisions and mobilising resources in ways 
that do not primarily depend on the decisions 
and assets of others. Rather than isolation, it is 
about building a stronger position for cooperation 
and partnership. Rather than a binary concept, it is a 
matter of degree – full autonomy may not be achievable, 
but progress can and should be made towards 
making Europe more self-reliant. Pursuing strategic 
autonomy means strengthening the basis for European 
sovereignty; the ability to control outcomes.
As such, strategic autonomy encompasses three 
principal domains: the economy, technology, and 
security and defence. Advancing strategic autonomy 
effectively requires not only focusing on distinct  
areas but also on their interconnections, through  
an overarching approach. This Paper outlines 
requirements and priorities for advancing strategic 
autonomy across the board. A strong economic base 
is the bedrock of power and influence in international 
affairs, as it delivers both resources and prestige. The 
Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union 
provide the EU with strategic depth in geo-economic 
competition and should be deepened further. This 
includes strengthening the international role of  
the euro.  
Building a more autonomous Europe is not 
just about better protecting Europe but 
also about projecting a positive agenda on 
the global stage.
The EU will fail to advance towards strategic autonomy 
if it is not at the forefront of technological innovation 
and efforts to regulate emerging technologies. 
Europeans must focus more resources on fewer priorities 
and ensure that EU and national initiatives are mutually 
reinforcing to shape an innovation-driven industrial 
policy. The European security and defence agenda has 
widened and includes, on top of the traditional focus 
on crisis management, cybersecurity, cyber defence 
and territorial defence. Europe must become more 
self-reliant in all of these areas. For that, Europeans 
must intensify efforts to shape a shared strategic 
culture, including in the cyber domain, and invest in 
joint projects to generate defence capabilities that 
meet serious shortfalls, while strengthening their 
technological and industrial basis. 
4Failure to substantially advance strategic autonomy 
through concrete achievements in these three 
principal domains would relegate Europe to strategic 
dependence. In a world of greater competition and 
rising nationalism, this is not a sustainable political 
condition. In fact, strategic dependence would be 
both a symptom and a multiplier of centrifugal 
forces within the EU. 
Strategic autonomy encompasses 
three principal domains: the economy, 
technology, and security and defence.
The consequent hollowing out of the EU would also 
be a major geostrategic setback for the US. It is in 
Europe’s core interest to preserve a strong transatlantic 
partnership, which means that Europeans should gear 
up to be more effective partners, not followers. The 
alternative to a more integrated and autonomous Europe 
is a less transatlantic one – a playground for great 
power competition where democracy and liberalism 
erode, thus affecting the ultimate foundation of the 
transatlantic partnership. Making progress across all 
the dimensions of strategic autonomy will also increase 
the EU’s credibility and clout in dealing with China. The 
EU should leverage its rule-making power to set terms 
of engagement consistent with its interests and values 
while further engaging China in a dialogue on the future 
of the international order and the connectivity agenda. 
5Introduction
This Discussion Paper follows recent European Policy 
Centre publications and debates dedicated to  
revamping Europe’s approach to an increasingly 
challenging international context, which have led to 
various recommendations1:
q  First, equipping Europe with the tools to govern 
interdependence and mitigate confrontation in  
ways that meet the priorities of its citizens and 
therefore strengthen the legitimacy of the European 
Union (EU). 
q  Second, adopting a non-adversarial posture to cope 
with power politics, taking a strong stance in defence 
of Europe while not endorsing a zero-sum reading of 
global affairs. 
q  Third, making the EU a global shaping power 
by leveraging its rulemaking power, and better 
connecting internal policies and assets to external 
instruments and objectives in pursuit of a ‘rules-first’ 
(and not ‘rules-only’) strategy. 
q  Fourth, framing the debate about Europe’s strategic 
autonomy in much broader terms than security 
and defence and including the economic and 
technological dimensions, too. 
This Paper elaborates on these recommendations to 
place strategic autonomy at the top of the political 
agendas of the new EU leadership and of member states. 
The confusion that surrounds the debate about Europe’s 
strategic autonomy mirrors the uncertainty surrounding 
the prospects for European integration and the EU’s role 
in the world.  
However, Europe does not have the benefit of time. 
Developments such as the surge of multi-domain 
competition on the international stage, the unilateral 
policies of the Trump administration in the US, the 
rise of China as a more assertive shaping power and 
Russia’s antagonistic posture have stressed the political 
salience of Europe’s strategic autonomy. The pressing 
question is defining Europe’s place and purpose 
in a hardening global context. The 2016 EU Global 
Strategy (EUGS) has contributed to a new phase in the 
debate on Europe’s strategic autonomy in security and 
defence. In particular, the document stated that “[a]n 
appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy 
is important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and 
safeguard security within and beyond its borders.”2 In 
the last three years, as Europe’s strategic environment 
deteriorated, leaders such as German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, 
Commission President Jean-Paul Juncker and President 
of the European Council Donald Tusk have in different 
ways broadened the scope of the debate and raised the 
question of Europe’s autonomy, self-reliance  
and sovereignty. 
The debate on strategic autonomy has also exposed 
differences within the EU on the meaning and relevance 
of the concept, the scope of its application and its 
implications. While some consider strategic autonomy 
a requirement for Europeans to shoulder more 
responsibility for their own security and collaborate 
better with allies and partners, strategic autonomy in 
security and defence is regarded by others as potentially 
detrimental to the existing transatlantic bonds. 
Additionally, while some apply the concept to security 
and defence only, others have used it to stress the need 
for more European self-reliance on the international 
stage at large, cutting across issues of security, the 
economy and technology. Besides political and 
conceptual controversies, these debates have  
also highlighted serious gaps and shortcomings  
in institutional frameworks, capabilities and  
key technologies, which hamper the pursuit of  
strategic autonomy.
The goals, extent and requirements of Europe’s 
strategic autonomy depend, of course, on the policy 
areas at hand, whether it be in security and defence, 
technological leadership or economic statecraft. Besides, 
more consideration should be given to the meaning 
of strategic autonomy in a world that is not only more 
contested but also more connected. In today’s context, 
effective action depends not only on self-reliance when 
needed, but also on the ability to join forces with others, 
whenever possible. 
Taking a step back, there is first and foremost a need 
to find within Europe a shared understanding of what 
strategic autonomy means and why advancing it is in 
the common interest. This should form the basis for 
drawing more specific policy implications for EU and 
national policies in different areas, and for a clear and 
constructive dialogue about strategy autonomy with the 
US and other key partners. 
This Discussion Paper sets the question of strategic 
autonomy within the context of large forces shaping 
international and European affairs, addresses the 
definition and main components of strategic autonomy, 
looks at the purposes of and requirements for enhancing 
Europe’s strategic autonomy in some major policy fields, 
and relates the question of strategic autonomy to the 
partnerships of the EU with the US and China. 
61.  Making a difference in a more competitive world
Strategic autonomy cannot be debated or defined 
in a void. It is not an article of faith but rather a 
requirement generated by the fast development of 
Europe’s strategic context. The assessment of the main 
features of this context has been carried out several 
times, including for example in the run-up to the 2016 
EUGS. In the space of only three years, however, the 
international environment and the perception of threats 
and opportunities therein has changed significantly. 
Discussing strategic autonomy, therefore, requires 
updating the diagnosis of the central features of the 
international system and the trends shaping it, while 
refraining from the temptation to take them as the 
inevitable shape of things to come. By pointing to 
possible or likely futures, trends are tools to inform 
political choices, rather than lock them in.  
Europe must respond to the threats and 
challenges it faces – but a truly strategic 
approach to them requires preparing to 
counter and mitigate the drift towards a 
zero-sum world. This is precisely Europe’s 
core strategic task for the years ahead. 
Two decades ago, the conventional wisdom was that 
history was over, the world was flat, and liberalism had 
prevailed. Today, it is generally accepted that great 
power competition is the new norm and that the liberal 
order is on life-support. The experience of the last 20 
years, however, suggest caution with simply projecting 
conventional assumptions in the future. Events, and 
far-sighted leadership, can make a difference. Europe 
must respond to the threats and challenges it faces – but 
a truly strategic approach to them requires preparing to 
counter and mitigate the drift towards a zero-sum world. 
This is precisely Europe’s core strategic task for the 
years ahead. 
1.1   COUNTERVAILING TRENDS
A variety of often countervailing forces is shaping 
the international system. The cumulative impact 
of these developments is that competition in the 
system is growing, making it more unstable and 
vulnerable to disruptions. Two sets of trends can be 
highlighted here. Their principal driver is the ongoing 
technological revolution. Their principal manifestation 
is the increasingly antagonistic relationship between 
two superpowers preoccupied with redefining their 
respective roles – the US and China. 
q  The first set of trends is the simultaneous diffusion 
and concentration of power. If it is true that 
power is shifting both among and beyond states to 
non-state actors, it is equally the case that large 
amounts of resources are accruing to large state 
powers or companies. Continent-sized powers are 
trying to revamp spheres of influence, huge digital 
conglomerates are expanding their reach into all 
spheres of life, and large state-owned companies, 
such as in China or Russia, are vectors of mercantilist 
policies.3 The balance between the diffusion and 
concentration of power requires a more granular 
analysis and varies depending on different assets. 
Besides, the distribution of power assets does not 
reveal much on whether and how (effectively) they 
are converted into outcomes.4 Size matters, but does 
not necessarily deliver. What can be said, however, is 
that one of the principal drivers of both the diffusion 
and the concentration of power is the technological 
revolution that is reshaping industries, politics, 
globalisation and strategic affairs.5
q  The second set of trends consists of the 
simultaneous intensification of competition 
and connectivity worldwide. The balance between 
the two forces is fluid. For one, interdependence 
can be a robust restraint on power politics and 
confrontation, as highly connected powers have much 
to lose from conflict. For another, interdependence 
can be leveraged to gain an advantage over rivals 
while connectivity can become a vector of political 
influence.6 The current standoff between the US and 
China shows some of the dilemmas of rivalry among 
great powers in a connected world. Competition and 
cooperation will likely continue to coexist in relations 
between actors both great and small. However, the 
assumption of convergence among great powers has 
been replaced by the expectation that differences 
will endure and related tensions sharpen. Increasing 
competition on the global stage takes place across 
many levels simultaneously. While major powers 
are unlikely to use force against each other, they do 
compete across multiple domains including trade, 
finance, norms and ideas, (dis)information and 
cyberspace, and the military.7 The technological 
revolution can be a powerful multiplier of both 
competition and cooperation. Today, it is regarded as 
the most consequential arena for competition.8
On top of these trends, in the realm of norms and ideas, 
the last few years have seen the rise of nationalist 
forces and leaders in all global regions, fuelling 
a revival of identity politics.9 These forces have 
played the nationalist card to claim to defend the 
national community against the disruptions brought by 
globalisation, allegedly masterminded by liberal elites. 
Nationalism is often mobilised to provide legitimacy to 
leaders and rulers, portrayed as standing for national 
greatness and values against external threats. The 
nationalist surge is a major factor in the crisis of 
7multilateralism, as strongmen favour power politics  
or one-on-one transactions over the constraints of 
rules-based cooperation. 
1.2   THE US-CHINA STANDOFF
In such a volatile global context, the trajectories of 
the US and China and of their relationship will be 
decisive for the future of the international order. 
Given their outsized resources and ability to marshal 
them strategically – at least in principle –, Washington 
and Beijing carry unique structural power, namely the 
capacity to shape international orders; the rules of 
the system. From this standpoint, the world seems to 
be headed towards a turbulent duopoly rather than a 
multipolar configuration.10 The ‘known unknown’ is,  
in this context, the role that Europe will play. 
Neither the US nor China currently 
considers rules-based cooperation to be 
central to their respective strategies. 
The 2016 election of US President Donald Trump and 
the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China in 2017, where President Xi Jinping outlined 
his ambitious vision of China as a global power, have 
marked significant turning points in the trajectories  
of the two countries. Both events can also be seen as  
the tipping points of deeper trends: the struggle of the 
US to redefine its leadership position in a system where 
it is less dominant than it was; and China’s struggle 
to rise as a global shaping power while advancing a 
very different political-economic model, values and 
worldview from the West.11
Neither the US nor China currently considers  
rules-based cooperation to be central to their  
respective strategies. The Trump administration has 
broadly disengaged from multilateralism, based on  
the assessment that it is no longer beneficial for the 
US. The administration has been making intermittent 
references to pursuing cooperation with likeminded 
countries, but realpolitik and the preponderant 
emphasis on the nationalist ‘America First’ agenda 
have overshadowed these calls. China’s statement of 
support for an open international economic system is 
unconvincing, given the considerable mismatch  
between their words and deeds. The role of the state 
in China’s growth (i.e. Made in China 2025) and 
connectivity strategies (i.e. Belt and Road Initiative)  
is the subject of growing concerns and controversy  
on the international stage. China’s subsidies to Chinese 
companies, forced technology transfers and limits  
to foreign investment in China are widely regarded as 
distorting trade and competition. Beyond that, China  
has taken a selective approach to global governance 
while guarding its sovereignty and national  
interests closely. 
The relationship between Washington and Beijing 
features growing competition across multiple 
domains. In the US, China is broadly regarded as a 
strategic competitor, and there is a growing consensus 
that a stronger stance is necessary to deal with the 
intertwining normative, economic and security 
implications of China’s rise, and the return of power 
politics at large. Some point to the prospect of what The 
Economist has recently defined as a “new kind of cold 
war.”12 President Trump’s decision to blacklist Huawei 
and effectively cut any dealings between US entities 
and this Chinese company, amidst an already escalating 
US-China trade war, raises the level of confrontation and 
might provoke cascading retaliatory measures – even 
though the ban has been partially relaxed following 
the Trump-Xi meeting at the Osaka G20 summit in 
June 2019. The steps to come remain unclear. Many 
believe that such measures will lead to the progressive 
technological and economic decoupling of the US and 
China and the emergence of separate digital and, more 
broadly, geo-economic orders or spheres.13
The balance between confrontation, competition and 
cooperation in the future Sino-American relationship 
is crucial to the evolution of the international order. 
Presidents Trump and Xi may still reach a trade deal 
by 2020, which would curb the current geo-economic 
escalation. However, it is unlikely that the underlying 
US-China rivalry will subside any time soon. The 
question is thus how this rivalry will play out, what 
possibilities for cooperation will remain, and what the 
consequences for others will be, including Europe.
1.3   EUROPE’S SHAPING POWER
This precarious outlook suggests various scenarios for 
the future of multilateralism. Four critical variables to 
be observed are: 
q  The degree to which the US and China will operate 
through multilateral structures and approaches, as 
opposed to sheer unilateralism or transactional deals.
q  How the balance of power and norms will shift in 
global multilateral bodies, notably the United Nations 
(UN), and the consequences for the agendas of those 
organisations (e.g. on matters like the environment 
and human rights). 
q  The level of entrepreneurship of the US and China 
in setting up new, separate arrangements – already 
a central feature of international cooperation. The 
US has often led the creation of ad hoc groupings 
or coalitions (e.g. the Major Economies Forum 
on Energy and Climate, Proliferation Security 
Initiative), while China has diversified its portfolio of 
multilateral investment, creating a set of institutions 
and platforms parallel to traditional ones (e.g. the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) and various 
interregional dialogues.14
8q  The scope of engagement between all these 
institutions – global, regional and mini-lateral.  
The question is how coexisting orders and  
institutions will connect, disconnect or bluntly  
clash, with multilateralism becoming messier and 
more contested.15
While it is uncertain how these four variables will play 
out, many factors point to a messier, more contested 
multilateral system. If those supporting rules-based 
multilateral cooperation do not mobilise and join forces 
to advance it, there is a veritable risk of a drift towards a 
post-multilateral world.
Faced with multilevel competition, assertive power 
politics and the crisis of multilateralism, Europe must 
choose between being a shaping power, or being shaped 
and most likely torn apart.16 The EU will play a central 
role in the development of the international order, 
whether it be through its absence or active engagement. 
The size of the EU implies that when Europeans take 
joint positions, considerable agenda-setting and 
rulemaking power is generated. Think of its trade 
and climate negotiations, the clout of its competition 
policy on global corporate juggernauts and the reach 
of its regulatory regimes, like the recent General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).17 Europeans can make 
a difference on major geopolitical issues too, such 
as in striking the Iran nuclear deal (the 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action) or in responding to 
Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine.  
The EU will play a central role in the 
development of the international order, 
whether it be through its absence or  
active engagement. 
The EU can therefore exert considerable shaping power 
on the global stage as long as it acts strategically by 
setting shared goals and equipping itself with the  
means to achieve them. In other words, strategic 
autonomy is an essential enabler of Europe’s 
contribution to the resilience, reform and effectiveness 
of the multilateral order. Europeans can support 
multilateralism in many ways: 
q  The EU and its member states are together the biggest 
funders of global multilateral bodies – particularly  
in a time of cuts by the US – and should work together 
to convert their contribution into agenda-setting 
power. This includes assessing how European  
support translates into influence, to direct 
contributions more effectively. 
q  Europe is a crucial partner to bodies such as the 
UN and the African Union, and recent initiatives 
aim to strengthen these partnerships further, not 
least on matters of peace and security. The EU 
could also further mobilise its links with regional 
bodies to create common ground on new issues of 
global governance, such as the regulation of new 
technologies. 
q  The EU can and should make a strong contribution 
to the reform of international institutions while 
engaging with key partners. For example, on trade 
matters, the EU has been meeting with the US and 
Japan since 2017 to discuss trade-distorting practices 
and the reform of international trade rules while 
presenting in 2018 its own approach to the reform 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), followed by 
proposals advanced together with several partners 
concerning the functioning of the WTO’s Appellate 
Body.18 These initiatives may not deliver in the short 
term, but they help shape the terms of the debate and 
create platforms for dialogue with others.  
To paraphrase Winston Churchill, 
multilateralism can be seen as the worst 
form of running international affairs, 
except for all the others. 
The stakes are very high. Firstly, to paraphrase Winston 
Churchill, multilateralism can be seen as the worst 
form of running international affairs, except for all the 
others. Rules-based cooperation may be cumbersome 
and require difficult compromises for long-term gains, 
but is surely preferable to unilateralism, exclusive 
great power ‘concerts’ or recurrent wars. Secondly, in 
practice, multilateralism has brought vast benefits to 
not only Europe and the US but to all global regions 
and powers more widely. Since multilateral cooperation 
is delivering less today, action should be taken at two 
levels: addressing the gaps and gridlocks, if need be on 
a mini-lateral level to begin with; and ensuring that 
globalisation delivers for all citizens, which may  
require more regulation of global flows. Thirdly, in a 
post-multilateral world, the EU would be much more 
exposed to shocks, crises and geopolitical threats,  
which would diminish its ability to deliver for its 
citizens. From this standpoint, strategic autonomy is 
therefore not only about effective European action on 
the global stage, nor supporting a rules-based order out 
of principle – strategic autonomy is about the future 
of European integration.
92.  Strategic autonomy or ‘muddling downwards’
The debate about strategic autonomy is ultimately one 
about Europe’s political cohesion. It cannot be separated 
from a frank assessment of where the Union stands, and 
of the domestic challenges that it is facing. The revival 
of nationalism that has crossed the world has not spared 
Europe.19 Populist and nationalist forces have played 
a role in shaping Europe’s agenda well beyond their 
electoral reach, either by advancing their priorities or by 
undercutting those of others. On top of glaring fractures 
and major disruptions (e.g. the issue of migration, 
Brexit), the contagion of nationalism permeates the 
broader political debate in subtle ways.  
Europe may technically be better equipped 
than it was a decade ago, but it is also 
politically more fragile. 
Most national leaders do not endorse a nationalist 
agenda but are increasingly wearing national lenses 
when considering European matters, based on cost-
benefit calculations. The debate on the reform of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a case in point. 
Even the modest set of measures agreed by the Franco-
German Council of Ministers at their June 2018 summit 
in Meseberg met the opposition of fiscally rigorous 
northern EU countries, preoccupied with the risk of 
Southern Europe abusing any risk-sharing arrangement. 
It took another year to reach the next small step, in 
the form of a quite generic preliminary agreement in 
June 2019 on the main features of a budget to foster 
convergence and competitiveness in the eurozone. No 
country is beyond reproach when it comes to the root 
causes and the subsequent management of the financial 
crisis that hit the eurozone – but the inability to 
conceive a package deal that balances demands from the 
‘responsibility’ and the ‘solidarity’ camps makes Europe 
more vulnerable to future financial crises, and fuels 
mutual alienation.20
If nationalist and populist forces have often been setting 
the terms of debate in Europe, that is in no small degree 
also the responsibility of the pro-European camp. In 
the face of pressing crises, their playbook has been 
to muddle through the political divergence among 
the capitals. Whether it be on migration or economic 
matters, political leaders have succeeded in buying time 
but have not provided lasting solutions. As a result, 
there is a mismatch between incremental progress at the 
policy level and deepening rifts in European politics. 
Europe may technically be better equipped than it 
was a decade ago, but it is also politically more fragile. 
Successive crises have eroded the level of political 
tolerance for further accidents. For example, controversy 
on the management of very few ‘secondary’ movements 
of migrants within the EU engulfed the June 2018 
European Council and even appeared to threaten the 
Schengen Area. Muddling through is leading to 
‘muddling downwards’ – a slippery slope that could 
lead to the hollowing out of the EU.
These developments carry multiple implications for 
Europe in the world. On one level, external forces 
seeking to draw wedges between EU member states 
can compound these trends by fostering anti-European 
narratives, cooperating with nationalist parties or 
leveraging their economic clout. Hybrid operations, 
so-called ‘political warfare’ and geo-economic 
manoeuvres can find fertile ground in a Union where 
member states do not see solidarity as a principle of 
general application but rather as an option, evoked when 
it fits their respective agendas. There is ample reporting 
of the interference of Russian actors – state, non-state 
or state-sponsored – with democratic politics in the 
EU, including in the run-up to the recent European 
elections.21 To give another example, the lure of Chinese 
investment in some member states has diluted EU 
consensus vis-à-vis China, as in the case of the July 2016 
ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning 
China’s claims on the South China Sea.22
On another level, the contagion of nationalism affects 
both foreign policymaking, as EU leaders are unwilling 
or unable to achieve or maintain common positions; 
and the credibility of the EU as a global shaping power. 
Nationalist political forces in Hungary, Italy and France 
have openly expressed scepticism on preserving EU 
sanctions against Russia. These and various other 
nationalist forces in Europe have also opposed the 
ratification of the (non-binding) UN’s Global Compact 
for Migration, adopted at Marrakesh in December 
2018.23 If the EU struggles to operate based on common 
rules and values, then it will carry less weight when 
promoting them on the global stage. The political 
fragmentation engendered by populisms risks to drain 
the EU’s core asset in the world – its identity as a Union 
of states and peoples that have decided to pull national 
sovereignty for the common good. 
The debate and decisions on strategic 
autonomy are therefore a critical 
bellwether of the attitudes towards mutual 
solidarity and European integration.
These risks, which are not theoretical and are already 
challenging Europe’s reputation and foreign policy, 
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point to the deep, two-way connection between political 
cohesion at home and strategic autonomy abroad. They 
also expose the fundamental inconsistency that often 
undermines rhetorical calls for Europe to become a 
stronger global actor while neglecting or dismissing the 
requirements for further political integration. If Europe 
is to punch its weight in an environment of multilevel 
competition, member states must trust each other and 
share a sense of belonging to the same community. 
Lacking these premises, Europe would remain an 
occasional international player at best, vulnerable to 
external interference. What cannot happen is having  
the proverbial cake and eating it: political fragmentation 
at home and a robust, joint approach to competition 
or threats from abroad. The debate and decisions on 
strategic autonomy are therefore a critical bellwether  
of the attitudes towards mutual solidarity and  
European integration.
3.  Defining strategic autonomy: A precondition 
for European sovereignty
Strategic autonomy is a blurry concept, which in part 
explains the controversy that surrounds it. Focusing 
on its definition, components and scope helps clarify 
the terms of the debate on the implications of strategic 
autonomy for Europe, and for its role in the world. 
Definitions of strategic autonomy vary in scope and 
emphasis. At first, the concept has found application in 
the European debate on security and defence issues.24 
In this context, the basic components of strategic 
autonomy have been outlined since the 1998 Saint-Malo 
Declaration, which triggered the development of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). According 
to the Declaration, “the Union must have the capacity 
for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness 
to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”25 
Again concerning European security and defence, recent 
definitions have essentially focused on three dimensions 
of strategic autonomy: the political, operational and 
industrial. According to Ronja Kempin and Barbara 
Kunz, the political component concerns “the capacity 
to take security policy decisions and act upon them”, 
operational autonomy is about the institutional and 
capability requirements to plan and carry out crisis 
management operations, and the industrial component 
has to do with the “ability to develop and build the 
capabilities required to attain operational autonomy.”26
Other contributions have taken a broader perspective, 
applying the concept of strategic autonomy to foreign 
and security policies at large, to the full scope of 
Europe’s external action and, beyond that, to the ability 
to make defining decisions on one’s own future. A report 
by the German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs defines strategic autonomy “as the ability to set 
one’s own priorities and make one’s own decisions in 
matters of foreign policy and security, together with the 
institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry 
these through – in cooperation with third parties, or if 
need be alone.”27 
Paul Timmers frames strategic autonomy as “the ability, 
in terms of capacity and capabilities, to decide and act 
upon essential aspects of one’s longer-term future in 
the economy, society and their institutions.”28 This 
paper’s author has argued that strategic autonomy 
requires “the ability to set objectives and mobilise 
the necessary resources in ways that do not primarily 
depend on the decisions and assets of others” and that 
it rests on four pillars, namely the Single Market, the 
euro, the capacity for technological innovation and 
the capacity to provide for Europe’s security.29 In a 
recent contribution, Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro 
propose to replace the concept of strategic autonomy 
with ‘strategic sovereignty’, which subsumes geo-
economic and geopolitical issues within an overarching 
approach and allows “Europeans to decide their policies 
for themselves and bargain effectively within an 
interdependent system.”30
Pursuing strategic autonomy is therefore 
part of a renewed effort to strengthen the 
basis for European sovereignty.
Taking a step back, the political, institutional and 
functional components are common to practically 
all the definitions of strategic autonomy and are 
relevant to all areas where it can be pursued. 
q  Politically, strategic autonomy requires a common 
understanding of large goals, which is predicated on 
mutual trust and a sense of shared destiny. 
q  In a political system of 28 countries, the EU’s 
adequate institutions are also crucial in enabling 
decision-making, setting rules and managing pooled 
resources in flexible, effective and legitimate ways. 
q  The functional dimension includes both the material 
and immaterial resources that are to be aligned to 
fulfil major goals and enable autonomous action 
when necessary, whether they be adequate funds, 
military capabilities or cutting-edge technological 
expertise. 
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Strategic autonomy should also be related to the 
question of European sovereignty and considered 
a precondition for it, with the understanding of 
sovereignty as “the ability to control outcomes and 
respond to the fundamental needs of the people”.31 
This is the heart of European integration: sharing 
sovereignty in some domains to become more 
effective in its exercise. Pursuing strategic autonomy 
is therefore part of a renewed effort to strengthen the 
basis for European sovereignty in changing international 
and domestic contexts. Given the serious internal and 
external challenges to Europe’s cohesion as illustrated 
in this Discussion Paper, the requirements for European 
sovereignty are not those of the past. In this sense, 
strategic autonomy contributes to sovereignty in  
three ways: in terms of responsibility, resilience and 
peer partnership. 
q  Firstly, advancing strategic autonomy implies taking 
responsibility for Europe’s future to a further extent 
than is the case today. This requires creating the 
conditions for Europeans to make shared decisions 
about critical issues (e.g. the application of new 
technologies, a sustainable development model, 
major foreign policy matters) and be equipped to 
implement them. 
q  Secondly, strategic autonomy is about strengthening 
the EU’s own resilience to the challenges of 
globalisation (from financial shocks to massive 
migration flows) as well as to the political and 
economic tactics employed deliberately by others to 
divide Europe. 
q  Thirdly, strategic autonomy is not about isolation, but 
rather building a stronger platform for cooperation 
and partnership. In a world where big powers are 
more assertive, strategic autonomy is necessary to 
enter into peer partnerships with the heavyweights; 
and to avoid asymmetric relationships, where isolated 
EU members lack bargaining power. 
Concerning the scope of strategic autonomy, this should 
be assessed against the background of the large shifts 
and challenges outlined above. As the EU faces multilevel 
competition – of which economic statecraft, technological 
prowess and hybrid tactics are critical dimensions –, 
delimiting the pursuit of strategic autonomy to defence 
and security affairs is out of sync with the new strategic 
environment. Strategic autonomy entails the mobilisation 
of all relevant EU resources to strengthen Europe’s global 
role, which is, in turn, essential to meet the needs and 
expectations of its citizens.  
Strategic autonomy entails the 
mobilisation of all relevant EU resources 
to strengthen Europe’s global role, which 
is, in turn, essential to meet the needs and 
expectations of its citizens. 
Two final elements must be stressed to articulate the 
concept of strategic autonomy as applied to the EU. For 
one, autonomy is not a binary concept but a matter of 
degree. Full autonomy is, in many cases, unachievable 
and not necessarily desirable, but progress can be 
achieved to make Europe more self-reliant in advancing 
its interests and values. For another, strategic autonomy 
takes time. Where Europe lags, such as in completing 
the Single Market, developing some technological 
sectors or defence capabilities, it will of course not 
catch up overnight. However, a clear sense of direction 
should drive efforts over time, and its progress should be 
regularly and seriously assessed. Bearing that in mind, 
some of the building blocks of strategic autonomy are 
illustrated in the following sections. 
4.  Strategic autonomy across the board
A meaningful approach to Europe’s strategic autonomy 
should encompass three principal domains – the 
economy, technology, and security and defence matters. 
Progress in all three is essential in order for Europe 
to take more responsibility not only for its security 
and prosperity, but also for a stable, rules-based 
international order. The EU agenda for the next 
five years and beyond should focus not only on 
advancing strategic autonomy in distinct areas 
or policy fields but also, and crucially, on taking 
an overarching approach to strategic autonomy, 
assessing how progress in some fields (or lack thereof) 
impacts others. 
For example, it is hard to envisage the EU maintaining 
its economic clout and therefore regulatory power if 
it falls behind the curve of technological innovation. 
Likewise, the capacity to protect critical infrastructures 
from cyberattacks is essential not only to the defence 
and security of the Union but also to its broader 
economic resilience and competitiveness. Adequate 
military capabilities to uphold stability in Europe’s 
extended neighbourhood and protect the openness 
of the global commons – notably the sea, outer space 
and cyberspace – are also critical to the security of 
the flows that Europe depends upon for its prosperity 
and stability. Furthermore, it is only by taking an 
encompassing view of strategic autonomy that the 
EU will be able to leverage it for a larger, positive 
global agenda and narrative in support of rules-based 
cooperation.
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4.1   LEVERAGING MARKET POWER
A strong economic base is the bedrock of power 
and influence in international affairs and, 
therefore, of Europe’s strategic autonomy. Economic 
growth delivers both resources and prestige – pivotal 
requirements for international leadership. Advancing 
strategic autonomy in this domain encompasses 
action at two closely connected levels: preserving a 
strengthened economic power base and mobilising 
economic levers and tools at the international level to 
achieve Europe’s objectives. 
To borrow from geopolitical speak, the 
Single Market and EMU can provide  
Europe with strategic depth in the  
geo-economic competition – but first,  
both need deepening. 
EU leaders meeting at the European Council in March 
2019 stressed the importance of connecting different 
aspects of Europe’s economic agenda – the EMU, the 
Single Market, and industrial, digital and trade policies 
–, for Europe’s prosperity and global role.32 They 
envisaged a set of milestones across different areas 
running up to the summit in March 2020, dedicated 
to strengthening the economic base of the EU. The 
strategic agenda for 2019-2024, adopted by EU leaders 
in June 2019, outlines the same message and priorities.33 
Critical to this all-around endeavour is the completion 
of the Single Market and EMU; they are the two main 
factors that will provide the EU with the scale and 
therefore clout in international affairs. To borrow 
from geopolitical speak, the Single Market and EMU 
can provide Europe with strategic depth in the geo-
economic competition – but first, both need deepening. 
According to a recent estimate, the Single Market has 
contributed an additional 9% to EU GDP.34 It is also the 
propeller of the EU’s rulemaking power, which translates 
into several areas, from product standards and trade and 
investment to competition and energy policies.35 The 
EU’s rulemaking power is central in preserving and 
fostering connectivity in ways that fit EU interests 
and values. The next big challenge will be to extend 
this power to the governance of new technologies, and 
completing the digital single market (DSM) will be an 
essential step. Recent years have seen considerable 
progress, including the GDPR and the end of roaming 
charges and geo-blocking. 
However, enhancing Europe’s competitiveness and 
growth in the emerging global digital economy will 
require more efforts in reducing the barriers to digital 
flows and services while preserving fair competition.36 
In so doing, it will be necessary to calibrate the right 
balance between issues of privacy and accountability 
and the free flows of data, the lifeblood of the new 
economy. Such regulatory balancing acts will carry 
significant influence on the global stage.
The GDPR, in force since May 2018, is the basis upon 
which the EU is contributing to shape an international 
level playing field for data flows and protection. The 
adequacy decision that has accompanied the entry into 
force of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 
in early 2019 marks, according to the European 
Commission, “the first time the EU and a third country 
agreed on mutual recognition of the adequate level 
of data protection.”37 Beyond digital data, EU trade 
agreements include a range of regulatory provisions 
such as on labour and environmental standards, thus 
establishing a level playing field for mutual exchanges 
and fostering rules-based cooperation more broadly. 
At the same time, adequate action ensuring the 
implementation and enforcement of the provisions 
included in trade deals must be taken. This is a powerful 
vector for Europe’s autonomy as a global economic 
and regulatory power. While its share of global trade is 
declining, the EU continues to be the top trading partner 
of 80 countries worldwide (including the US, China and 
Russia), and has free and preferential trade agreements 
or partnership and cooperation agreements in force  
with 38 countries, agreements partially in place  
with 49 partners, and ongoing negotiations with about 
20 more.38
The EU accounts for about one-third of inward and 
outward global foreign direct investment stocks.39 This 
gives the bloc much leverage in establishing the terms 
for investing in Europe, and the same can apply to 
investments deployed abroad as part of larger objectives. 
Strengthening Europe’s economic power base 
requires ensuring that all foreign investment abides 
by Single Market rules, fostering coordination among 
EU member states for screening foreign investment in 
strategic sectors, and establishing reciprocal mutual 
market access with Europe’s partners. 
On the external front, while investment is essentially 
business-driven, the EU can act strategically to cluster 
public and private investment in regions or policy areas 
of strategic relevance through adequate incentives and 
facilities. This can help trigger economic development, 
foster resilience and sustainability, expand the reach of 
EU norms and standards, and create a level playing field 
for cooperation with others. 
The EU and member states should harness the 
opportunity of the negotiations on the upcoming  
2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to 
review the experience of current financing instruments 
and facilities and establish a comprehensive and flexible 
strategic architecture for foreign funding, in cooperation 
with the European Investment Bank and other financial 
institutions.40 Furthermore, crafting and implementing a 
focused agenda to foster EU-Asia connectivity, building 
on the recently adopted EU strategic document, would 
add an innovative dimension of strategic autonomy.41
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The strengthening of the international role of 
the euro is another central dimension of progress 
towards Europe’s strategic autonomy. The common 
currency is an essential factor for the deepening and 
resilience of the Single Market: it offers eurozone 
citizens and companies predictability in the face of 
drastic exchange rates fluctuations, contains inflation 
and keeps interest rates low, thus facilitating the 
sustainability of public and private debt. However, the 
financial and economic crisis that has engulfed the 
EU has not only polarised Europe’s politics but also 
affected trust in EMU’s long-term sustainability and 
the role of the euro. The eurozone needs consolidation 
and deepening to prevent the further widening of 
asymmetries among the eurozone economies, improve 
Europe’s resilience against financial shocks and send 
a strong message of cohesion to its citizens and the 
rest of the world.42 The deepening of the eurozone 
is also widely regarded as a requirement to foster 
the international role of the euro43: while the euro 
remains the second most used global currency by 
most benchmarks, its international role has not fully 
recovered from the financial crisis.
A more prominent role for the euro as an 
international currency would benefit European 
businesses and citizens and help protect Europe 
from the weaponisation of financial power in the 
pursuit of foreign policy objectives that may differ 
from its own44, such as in the case of the US’ secondary 
sanctions on Iran. Given the unparalleled reach of the 
US dollar and its financial system, the combination 
of sheer unilateralism and the extraterritorial effect 
of US secondary sanctions squeezes allies, while also 
damaging the reputation of the US as a responsible 
leader.45 Given this new context, a reflection on how to 
enhance the role of the euro and, therefore, Europe’s 
financial resilience, has been revamped in Europe. 
As the European Commission has stressed in its 
December 2018 communication on strengthening the 
international role of the euro, this means, in particular, 
completing the banking union, advancing the capital 
markets union and providing large volumes of safe 
euro-denominated assets.46 The latter would, in turn, 
contribute to deeper capital markets and a stronger 
banking system. In short, boosting the international role 
of the euro requires measures that send an unambiguous 
message on the irreversibility of the eurozone, while 
also providing enhanced liquidity and safety for private 
market operators. 
Yet as clear as the steps to take may be, the huge 
political difficulties in moving down this path are 
equally evident.47 Different camps of member states 
continue to struggle on the dosage of rigour and 
flexibility in the eurozone fiscal policy posture, while 
levels of mutual trust are low.48 Furthermore, the 
larger use of the euro as a global currency would likely 
lead to its appreciation, which would, to some degree, 
challenge the export-oriented growth model of various 
eurozone members. The position of Germany will, of 
course, be decisive in determining the way forward. It is, 
however, clear that deepening the eurozone is a critical 
requirement for making of the EU a more autonomous 
global actor and, therefore, a test for Europe’s true 
aspirations.
4.2   TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP
Technology has always been a primary source of 
prosperity and power. Today, new and emerging 
technologies are reshaping the domains, terms and tools 
of cooperation and competition on the international 
stage. Technological innovation is simultaneously 
accelerating and increasingly diffused. The acceleration 
of digital innovation particularly creates unprecedented 
opportunities for sustainable human development 
and well-being, civic and political participation, and 
international cooperation. However, it also affects the 
distribution of power at all levels, expands the grounds 
for economic and political competition and creates  
new vulnerabilities. 
The diffusion of technological innovation to new 
economic powerhouses and the major advances 
made by China in key sectors, from fifth-generation 
mobile technology (5G) to AI, will carry far-reaching 
implications for economic growth, normative reach, 
political influence and security in different parts  
of the world.  As noted above, much of the current 
competition between the US and China is about 
employing technological primacy as an enabler of 
international leadership. 
The EU will fail to advance towards 
strategic autonomy if it is not at the 
forefront of both technological innovation 
and the efforts to regulate the applications 
of new technologies in ways that are 
consistent with its interests and values.
The EU will fail to advance towards strategic autonomy 
if it is not at the forefront of both technological 
innovation and the efforts to regulate the applications 
of new technologies in ways that are consistent with 
its interests and values.49 As a recent paper by Timmers 
put it, “mastery of digital technologies is an essential 
capability for future competitiveness, protecting 
society’s values and bridging the ‘sovereignty gap’.”50 
From this standpoint, the capacity for technological 
innovation is also a major requirement for Europeans 
in order to be able to make basic choices on their future 
economic and social models, as opposed to living with 
the choices made by those who drive innovation outside 
of Europe. 
For example, in 2018 the European Commission 
launched a series of initiatives to shape a European 
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approach to AI, directed to not only support 
technological development but also deal with the 
impact of AI on labour markets, develop talents and 
skills, and shape a governance framework for the 
multiple applications of this emerging technology. 
The Commission has established a High-Level Expert 
Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG), tasked with 
supporting the evolution of the EU approach to the 
ethical, socioeconomic and legal implications of AI. 
This Group delivered a report on ethics guidelines for 
trustworthy AI in April 2019 and another on policy and 
investment recommendations, including on a suitable 
governance framework, in June 2019.51 These are the 
first steps in shaping a distinct European approach to 
AI, which is essential both to enable Europe’s future 
competitiveness and to prevent dangerous uses of this 
technology, such as for mass surveillance. According to 
some estimates, the application of AI could raise global 
GDP by 14%, or $15,7 trillion, by 2030. In particular, the 
economic impact of AI would lift China’s GDP by 26%, 
that of North America by 14.5%, that of Southern Europe 
by 11,5% and that of Northern Europe by 9,9%.52
The EU holds strong assets in facing the technological 
innovation challenge, such as excellent research 
institutions, a wide pool of talent and a large internal 
market. According to the Reuters’ list of the 100 most 
innovative universities in the world, 46 (and eight of 
the top ten) are in the US, 27 in Europe and 23 in Asia.53 
However, there is a need for urgent action in preserving 
and expanding these assets. Europe has failed to meet 
the objective of spending 3% of its GDP on research 
and development (R&D), with investment at around 
2% (about the same share of GDP as in China) in 2017; 
compared to 4.2% in South Korea, 3.3% in Japan and 
2.8% in the US.54 The competition for global talent is in 
full swing between academic institutions and corporate 
actors, while the Single Market is failing to deliver its 
full potential, whether through larger access to venture 
capital or the free flow of digital services. Besides, the 
EU is falling behind major competitors in the US and 
China on various fronts of innovation.55 
The EU holds strong assets in facing the 
technological innovation challenge, such 
as excellent research institutions, a wide 
pool of talent and a large internal market. 
China is leading in setting the standards for 5G, even 
though EU companies such as Nokia and Eriksson have 
a strong track record too. Furthermore, China benefits 
from the largest domestic market in the world, which 
will in turn generate massive volumes of data, further 
empowering Chinese companies in the digital economy. 
Europe’s delay in the development of a competitive 5G 
industry implies that EU countries will face problems 
concerning both the security of their networks – as the 
current controversy surrounding Huawei shows – and 
the control of the data generated by hyper-connected 
economies and societies.56 These are both central 
requirements for strategic autonomy. When it comes 
to AI, China and the US are leading in R&D and host 
the largest shares of high-value AI start-ups by far. The 
more advanced AI is, the more performing the millions 
of devices connected through the IoT will be. In 2018, 
the EU was home to 132 of the 500 most important IoT 
companies in the world, while 236 were based in the US 
and 27 in China.57
Low levels of venture capital are another major obstacle. 
Despite growing quite fast in the last five years, venture 
capital in Europe stood at only $17.6 billion in 2017, 
against $71.9 billion in the US and $70.8 billion in 
Asia.58 Besides, the average size of venture capital funds 
in Europe is €60 million – half the US average – and 
they mostly operate within individual member states.59 
The scarcity of growth funding for companies past the 
launch phase is particularly problematic, as promising 
European digital start-ups are often acquired by  
non-EU (mostly American) companies and funds. 
Supporting Europe’s technological leadership and 
therefore strategic autonomy will require decisive action 
at three levels: 
q  Firstly, Europeans should decide what priorities to 
concentrate their resources on, from fundamental 
research to the full innovation cycle. A recent 
report by the High-level Strategy Group on Industrial 
Technologies has updated a previous list of six “key 
enabling technologies”, defined as the essential 
technology building blocks underpinning EU 
industrial leadership. The new entries on this list are 
AI, digital security and connectivity.60 In parallel, the 
work of the Strategic Forum for Important Projects 
of Common European Interest – identifying and 
supporting strategic European value chains – is one 
of the vectors of Europe’s fledgling industrial policy 
approach. Alongside areas of ongoing cooperation 
on batteries, high-performance computers and 
microelectronics, six additional areas have been 
selected for pooling resources.
q  Secondly, larger resources must be available to 
support innovation policies.61 Member states 
will soon face a moment of truth in the next phase 
of negotiations on the upcoming MFF, when they 
will have to decide on the Commission’s proposal 
to raise the share of the budget dedicated to 
innovation, including Horizon 2020 (H2020), by 
over 40%. While this is necessary, it will be equally 
important to ensure that the EU and national funds 
and initiatives work hand in hand to maximise 
impact. This will require better coordination between 
national strategies concerning the major sectors 
of technological innovation (e.g. AI), which are 
often developed in separate national silos. There 
will also be a need to build on the pilot experience 
of the European Innovation Council to target the 
most promising start-ups for funding under H2020. 
Crucially, Europeans must devise tools to provide 
more flexible financing to EU firms, particularly  
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high-potential start-ups that struggle to move from 
the research phase to market access. 
q  Thirdly, the regulatory framework must be 
updated or even established to enable the 
deployment and leveraging of new technologies 
and maximise the advantages of the Single 
Market, while ensuring security and seeking to 
establish a level playing field with external partners. 
As mentioned above, the EU’s experience with the 
regulation of the free flow of data is a case in point. 
Besides, the AI HLEG’s recent report fleshes out 
recommendations for a European approach to the 
governance and regulation of this crucial set of 
technologies. It calls for shaping regulation according 
to different types and levels of risk, reviewing 
existing legislation across various domains (from 
civil and criminal law to consumer protection and 
competition), expanding institutional capacity 
and expertise and fostering a Single Marker for 
trustworthy AI in Europe.62 Additionally, building on 
the March 2019 Commission recommendations on  
the cybersecurity of 5G networks63, a much stronger 
pan-European regime should be established to ensure 
that all member states and providers meet high 
security requirements.
4.3   STRENGTHENING EUROPE’S SECURITY 
AND DEFENCE
Today’s European security and defence agenda 
features multiple dimensions including 
cybersecurity and cyber defence, crisis management 
and territorial defence. While the perception of their 
relative importance has been shifting over the years and 
remains uneven across member states, all of them have 
become more pressing. Drawing from the experience 
of the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, the crisis 
management agenda drove the launch of the CSDP at 
the turn of the century. At that time, the priority was to 
project values and stability to the outside, rather than 
to protect Europe from external threats. However, since 
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine as of 2014, its 
military build-up from the Baltic to the Black Sea and 
the erosion of arms control regimes in Europe, the issue 
of territorial defence has made its way back to the top  
of the agenda, alongside new questions concerning  
the future of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence  
in Europe. 
Meanwhile, the spread of digital technologies, vital to 
the functioning of all sorts of critical infrastructures 
and institutions, has opened a new boundless and 
ubiquitous virtual front. European economies, 
societies and political systems are vulnerable to 
cyberattacks, whose frequency and intensity has 
been fast increasing in recent years.64 A large range 
of states are rapidly deploying not only defensive but 
also offensive cyber capabilities, which they can use 
either directly or through proxies and often as part 
of broader, hybrid destabilisation strategies. Beyond 
the serious and already diffused threat to citizens and 
civilian infrastructure (i.e. economic, financial, health, 
communication, transport, energy), cyber capabilities 
are central to strategic affairs and warfare.65 For 
example, using this digital weapon to undermine the 
functioning of complex armament systems could affect 
the strategic balance and cost-benefit calculations 
of rival powers in potentially destabilising ways. 
Advancements in AI and their application to military 
affairs engender further risks, favour offence, challenge 
deterrence and pose far-reaching questions concerning 
the control of future advanced autonomous weapons.66 
The spread of digital technologies has 
opened a new boundless and ubiquitous 
virtual front. 
Europe has no choice but to close ranks and become 
more self-reliant in all of these areas67, due to two 
concurrent factors. First, the ‘threat intensity’ that 
Europe faces is unlikely to dim in the foreseeable 
future. What is more, threats will increasingly intersect 
the dimensions outlined above. For example, non-state 
actors and state proxies could carry out cyberattacks 
on European forces deployed in crisis management 
theatres. Second, although it is unlikely that the US 
will fully disengage from European security or even 
withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), there is broad consensus that the strategic 
centre of gravity of the US is shifting towards the 
Asia-Pacific region. It can be expected that the US 
will therefore become much more selective in their 
engagement in and around Europe while delegating 
more of the military burden to partners.  If President 
Trump’s disregard for key European allies is a distinctive 
mark of his administration, the recalibration of the US 
strategic focus is a structural trend that preceded and 
will most likely follow it.68
In this context, Europeans cannot continue to 
rely on the US to the current extent, not only for 
territorial defence but also for undertaking crisis 
management operations. Europeans should take more 
responsibility for their own security and defence while 
placing more emphasis on the actual output of European 
efforts rather than simply the levels of national defence 
spending per se. It should be noted that defence 
spending in Europe has been growing since 201569, and 
is expected to continue to grow. This trend should not 
only be maintained but also accelerated, and resources 
should be allocated in more targeted ways to meet the 
high-end capability requirements highlighted by the 
Capability Development Plan (CDP). At the same time,  
it is only reasonable that as Europeans invest more in 
their defence capabilities, they also seek to strengthen 
their technological and industrial capacity to deliver  
the key assets they need; the institutional capacity to 
plan and run the operations they undertake on their 
own; and a common strategic culture to inform their 
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threat assessments, and their approach to the use  
of force.70
In line with the broader definition of strategic 
autonomy, a more self-reliant Europe in security and 
defence matters is therefore one that can foster the 
political will and strategic culture to deal with shared 
threats, is endowed with the necessary institutional 
structures to effectively operate together (from 
intelligence to operational planning), and has the 
industrial capacity to develop adequate capabilities 
across all domains of potential conflict, including cyber 
and space. Of course, European strategic autonomy 
does not imply that Europeans will or should 
operate solely through the EU. For one, stronger 
European capabilities will reinforce NATO’s core task 
of collective defence. For another, these capabilities 
can be deployed in crisis management operations 
undertaken under the aegis of different organisations 
(i.e. the EU, NATO, UN) or through ad hoc coalitions. 
However, strategic autonomy in this context means that 
Europeans would be able to achieve more on their own 
to fulfil a much wider spectrum of tasks, when need be.
In the field of crisis management, Europeans should 
further detail and fulfil the still loosely defined level of 
ambition they set out in the conclusions of the Foreign 
Affairs Council in November 2016.71 That requires 
the capacity to undertake all the crisis management 
tasks foreseen in Article 43 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and in particular the high-intensity 
peace-making operations in high-risk environments, 
rapid deployments, stabilisation, and air and maritime 
security operations. The ability of the EU to support its 
partner countries and institutions in this field through 
capacity building will be an increasingly important 
dimension of the EU becoming a more autonomous 
security provider, and one in line with using autonomy 
to expand cooperation. The establishment of a sizeable 
European Peace Facility, proposed by the Commission 
under the new MFF, would equip the EU for this task. 
Coping with cyber threats and the 
hybrid strategies that weaponise digital 
connectivity will require the development 
of a European cyber strategic culture and 
the scale-up of resources and expertise.
Concerning territorial defence, advancing Europe’s 
strategic autonomy is not intended to challenge 
NATO’s core prerogative for collective defence (which 
is recognised in the TEU and EUGS)72, but instead to 
enhance the European contribution to protecting the 
continent, alongside allies. Ongoing EU initiatives to 
foster military mobility in Europe are an example of the 
added value the Union can bring to a joint effort, besides 
the development of new capabilities, as described 
below. More attention should also be directed to the 
implementation of the TEU’s mutual defence clause in 
Article 42.7, as a complement to NATO’s guarantee, not 
least with a view to potential large-scale, high-impact 
terrorist or cyberattacks. 
In matters of cybersecurity and cyber defence, Europe 
should aim to make its infrastructure more resilient, its 
mutual defence and assistance mechanisms (including 
the solidarity clause in Article 222 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union) more effective, 
and its capabilities more robust.73 Coping with cyber 
threats and the hybrid strategies that weaponise digital 
connectivity – from prevention and recovery to the 
attribution of malicious activities – will require the 
development of a European cyber strategic culture and 
the scale-up of resources and expertise. While some 
steps have been taken, strong political leadership, 
coordination and cooperation at EU level will be 
essential to overcome the current fragmentation of 
national and EU-level efforts and responsibilities; and 
to develop adequate capabilities while possibly pooling 
some of them. 
This will need to be not just a ‘whole-of-the-EU’, but a 
‘whole-of-society’ approach, relying on adequate skills 
and awareness; the engagement of all public services 
(and not just those operating in the security field), and a 
stronger level of cooperation with private actors, making 
them more resilient and (when relevant) responsible. 
There is a need to ensure the tight implementation 
of common standards, reinforce EU level bodies 
(e.g. the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) 
and operationalise the recently adopted Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox to respond to cyber-attacks and 
the Cybersecurity Act.74 Fostering ongoing cooperation 
with NATO in countering cyber and hybrid threats is yet 
another major area where Europe’s strategic autonomy 
can serve a stronger alliance, benefiting the security of 
partners on both sides of the Atlantic.
Progress towards strategic autonomy in security 
and defence matters is inevitably a long-term 
undertaking. As a recent study put it, neither the 
operational nor the defence industrial components of 
strategic autonomy can currently be achieved within 
the EU. However, “to fail to pursue them consistently 
for that reason would run the risk of denying the EU a 
security profile of its own.”75
Today, about 90% of European defence research and 
technology expenditure and 80% of defence procurement 
take place at the national level, resulting in a clear 
waste of resources. It is essential that Europeans better 
coordinate their defence planning cycles through the 
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, consistently 
with the common priorities and requirements outlined 
in the CDP (which takes into account the NATO Defence 
Planning Process), so as to identify and fill common gaps 
through improved collaborative investment. This should 
contribute to the establishment of joint projects that 
EU countries wish to undertake, including within the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, 
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which is based on the binding commitments that the 25 
participating member states have taken on.76 Alongside 
a rationalisation of the (too) many projects launched 
during the initial phase of PESCO, member states 
should further sharpen and above all implement said 
commitments77, in particular those that concern their 
capacity to effectively carry out demanding military 
operations. Additionally, alongside the development 
of new capabilities, the availability and readiness of 
existing ones is an issue requiring urgent action. The 
economic incentive provided by the European Defence 
Fund to support collaborative research and capability 
development should create a strong incentive for member 
states to work together on large initiatives that fill the 
capability gaps while dedicating more resources to 
breakthrough technologies that will define the security 
landscape in the coming decades. 
These new arrangements are critically important but are 
not the only vector for defence cooperation in Europe. It 
will be crucial to ensure that these and other initiatives 
advance in consistent and mutually reinforcing ways. 
This applies, for example, to the European Intervention 
Initiative launched by France, directed to reinforce a 
common strategic and operational culture and draw up 
scenarios for possible interventions.
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Conclusion: Strategic autonomy for a positive agenda
Tangible achievements will be the stepping stones 
on Europe’s long road towards more strategic 
autonomy. Focusing on major policy initiatives brings 
the double benefit of generating concrete deliverables 
while steering clear of ideological debates. However, 
these achievements should be implemented as part 
of a larger strategic approach. Expectations should be 
managed, but a sense of purpose and direction should 
also be provided and consistently pursued. Strategic 
autonomy remains a contentious issue within the EU. 
However, if some are reluctant to endorse strategic 
autonomy, the alternative is very unattractive. 
The prospect of indefinite strategic dependence in a 
very volatile and turbulent international context is 
not promising. Whether it be in military, technological 
or financial terms, however, this is precisely the outcome 
to be expected in the case that strategic autonomy is 
neglected. With multilevel competition on the rise, no 
major power – barring the EU, when it is united – is 
investing in a rules-based global order. 
Dismissing strategic autonomy would  
not only weaken Europe but also be a 
symptom and multiplier of the hollowing 
out of the EU.
In this context, it would be a mistake to believe that 
strategic dependence is a politically sustainable 
condition, as was the case when Europe relied on the 
relatively benign hegemonic role of the US during the 
Cold War and its immediate aftermath. In a world where 
major powers seek to pull European countries apart 
in different directions, strategic dependence would 
aggravate Europe’s fragmentation. In other words, 
dismissing strategic autonomy would not only weaken 
Europe but also be a symptom and multiplier of the 
hollowing out of the EU. If the mutual trust to pursue 
strategic autonomy is lacking, solidarity is considered 
issue-based and every country ‘comes first’, then  
there is no compelling reason as to why individual 
countries should not seek to fulfil their own distinct 
(short-term) agendas, regardless of its impact on other 
member states. 
The only chance for Europeans to uphold their interests 
is by joining forces and, on that basis, working with 
their partners. The extent to which Europeans have 
already embedded their prosperity into deep institutions 
such as the Single Market and the EMU – alongside 
cooperation in almost all sectors of internal and 
external security – implies that the EU is an unparalleled 
structural platform for member states to operate at the 
international level.78 A profound change in mindset is 
required: EU leaders must accept that they cannot have 
it both ways; namely a stronger Europe ‘on the cheap’. 
In the face of centrifugal forces across the continent, 
the choice is to either reassert Europe’s unity and act 
accordingly, or lose it.
Contextualising strategic autonomy within the fraught 
and fluid politics of the EU also helps to make sense 
of its implications for transatlantic relations. The 
argument that Europe’s strategic autonomy would 
undermine the transatlantic partnership is flimsy. 
The US has entered a phase of erratic unilateralism 
that is powered by an unapologetic nationalist 
narrative, which has created or widened gaps with 
Europe on important issues. This does not mean that 
Washington will withdraw from Europe, or that future 
US administrations will adopt the same approach  
as Trump’s. 
However, there are structural trends at play that will 
likely make the US a more ordinary superpower – 
one less invested in building or leading the international 
order and more focused on major national interests, 
working on its own or with allies.79 In short, even 
in a post-Trump scenario, there is no going back 
to the comfortable, US-led post-Cold War liberal 
international order – so the transatlantic partnership 
must be adjusted accordingly.80 Preserving a strong 
transatlantic partnership is a core strategic interest 
for Europe. With a view to that, Europe should gear up 
to be a stronger and more resilient partner. The US, for 
their part, must acknowledge that a stronger partner 
does not equate a follower and that the alternative to 
a more integrated and autonomous Europe is a less 
transatlantic one. 
A profound change in mindset is required: 
EU leaders must accept that they cannot 
have it both ways; namely a stronger 
Europe ‘on the cheap’.
The progressive unravelling of the EU would be a major 
geostrategic setback for the US. A stronger Europe 
grounded in liberal values and seeking to foster them 
beyond its borders would be a more robust partner to 
the US, including through larger military capabilities.81 
Disagreements and irritants have punctuated the 
transatlantic relationship in the past and will surely 
still be present in a more mature and equal partnership. 
However, their relevance pales compared to the range 
of assets and political capital that Europeans can bring 
to the transatlantic table if they act together on matters 
of shared interests, such as the reform of global trade 
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regimes, the governance of new technologies, non-
proliferation, the fight against terrorism, the handling of 
regional crises or the security of the commons. 
The simple facts are that no country in Europe wishes 
to weaken NATO, that EU-US economic relations are 
by far the strongest in the world (taking into account 
trade and investment flows), and that people-to-
people contacts are the most extensive, building on 
largely shared values. Trying to prevent or undermine 
Europe’s strategic autonomy as opposed to encouraging 
it would be for the US a self-inflicted blunder. Beyond 
the very short term, a weaker and more divided Europe 
would not be a more docile Europe, but a Europe that 
becomes less liberal and is up for grabs amidst great 
power competition. Far from detracting from it, Europe’s 
strategic autonomy is actually an essential contribution 
to an effective transatlantic partnership. 
Europeans should unambiguously and 
jointly lay out the terms of engagement for 
their future partnership with China. 
Strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy is also 
crucial for future relations with China. In coping 
with the surge of the new superpower, Europe must 
assess how much connectivity and interdependence 
can be advanced with a partner featuring a very 
different economic and political system, while still 
firmly defending its own interests and values. Besides, 
Europe will need to decide how to deal with the growing 
economic, normative and political influence that 
China projects on to the international stage, not least 
through the vast Belt and Road Initiative. Europeans 
should unambiguously and jointly lay out the terms of 
engagement for their future partnership with China. 
The March 2019 EU strategy paper expressed the 
complexity of EU-China relations, identifying China 
as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival 
simultaneously, and signalled a shift in the EU  
approach towards a more realistic and robust stance 
vis-à-vis Beijing.82 EU leaders should continue to build 
on these proposals and highlight that the future scope 
of their partnership will depend on defining a reciprocal 
level playing field for mutual relations. At the same  
time, any attempt to interfere in Europe’s affairs must  
be countered. 
Europe’s credibility will critically depend on the 
strengthening of its own economic power base, its 
capacity for cutting-edge innovation and the updating 
of other internal policies, such as competition. 
Europe should also seek to foster its dialogue with 
China on the future of the international order, 
including respective approaches to multilateralism and 
connectivity. On this level too, Europe’s weight will 
depend on its ability to implement its own connectivity 
agenda through the effective coordination and targeting 
of adequate resources, and to leverage its rulemaking 
power at the multilateral level.
Appealing for more strategic autonomy is not just for 
the sake of Europe’s future relations with the US and 
China. Strategic autonomy is the necessary enabler 
for Europeans to make basic choices about their 
future. Equipping Europe to cope with mounting 
challenges is the necessary starting point, and not the 
endpoint. Strategic autonomy is also about finding the 
resources, confidence and credibility to shape a positive 
global agenda for rules-based cooperation, which can 
resonate with many well beyond Europe and should be 
used to set the terms of engagement with its partners. In 
other words, strategic autonomy is not just an insurance 
policy but also a statement of European cohesion, and a 
platform for multilateral agenda-setting. 
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